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Abstract 
 
We examine whether politically active firms play a role in disseminating political information 
via their management guidance. Using campaign financing activity or the presence of a 
government affairs office to proxy for firms’ access to political information, we find that 
politically active firms are more likely to issue management guidance overall, and especially 
when the government is a customer of the firm. Further, relative to politically inactive firms, the 
guidance released by politically active firms is more likely to discuss government policies. In 
addition to using numerous econometric techniques to address self-selection, we examine the 
timing of when guidance is issued. We find that politically active firms are more likely to issue 
guidance and change their government policy-related disclosures prior to the public revelation of 
government policy decisions. Collectively, these findings suggest that the privileged information 
firms obtain through their political activities is shared with investors through voluntary 
disclosures.     
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1. Introduction 
A recent line of research investigates the role of differential access to material nonpublic 
information from policymakers in securities markets (e.g., Gao and Huang 2016; Christensen et 
al. 2017). Privileged access to the strategic details of upcoming hearings, current policy 
positions, and any potential amendments that others might offer (i.e., political information) is 
made possible because members of Congress are legally permitted to selectively disclose such 
information to outside parties (see, e.g., Jerke 2010; Bainbridge 2012; Nagy and Painter 2012; 
Wright 1996). Initially, provisions that would have required mandatory disclosure around the 
flow of political information were included in the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge 
(STOCK) Act, which passed in April 2012, but these provisions were removed prior to the final 
vote on the bill. A subsequent bill was later introduced aimed at addressing the lack of 
transparency around the flow of political information (Political Intelligence Transparency Act of 
2017), but was not enacted, in part due to lack of evidence on how political information is 
disseminated, to whom, and for what purpose. Our paper aims to provide insights on whether 
firms with differential access to political information (i.e., politically active firms) have a role in 
voluntarily disseminating this information. Specifically, we investigate the impact of access to 
political information on voluntary disclosure by examining whether access to political 
information influences the provision and content of management guidance.   
Politically active firms’ information advantage may influence the provision and content 
of their guidance because it improves firms’ ability to assess the impact of expected political 
outcomes on firm performance. Consistent with the notion that politically active firms have 
better information about expected political outcomes relative to inactive firms (Bremmer 2005), 
prior research demonstrates that access to institutional details throughout the legislative and 
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regulatory process leads to more informed investment decisions (Wellman 2017; Ovtchinnikov 
et. al. 2019). Under this mechanism, access to private political information increases the quality 
of managers’ information about the potential impact of various policy alternatives, thereby 
reducing the costs associated with communicating those expectations to investors (see 
Verrecchia 1990). Thus, we predict that managers at politically active firms are more likely to 
issue management guidance and discuss government policy relative to managers at inactive 
firms.  
Even if access to political information improves firms’ ability to anticipate and analyze 
the impact of various policy alternatives, there are several reasons that managers may be 
reluctant to convey this information to investors. First, if expected political outcomes are 
unfavorable for the firm, managers may be reluctant to issue “bad news” guidance (e.g., Beyer et 
al. 2010). Second, even if managers expect favorable policy developments, they may incur 
proprietary costs. That is, firms may be reluctant to disclose political information because it also 
reveals a competitive advantage that politically active firms have over their inactive industry 
peers (Ferracuti et al. 2019).1 Relatedly, firms with political connections may face lower capital 
market incentives and/or litigation risk, making it less likely to voluntarily disclose information 
(Hung et al. 2018). Finally, the source of the political information (e.g., members of Congress) 
may prefer that firms not disclose privileged information to the market, as doing so may damage 
the relationship between the firm and the politician. Thus, whether access to political information 
affects voluntary disclosure is an empirical question.  
To investigate this issue, we test whether the propensity to provide management guidance 
is associated with firms’ access to political information. We examine two proxies for firms’ 
access to this information based on their political activism. Our first proxy relies on arguments in 
 
1 See, for example, Bamber and Cheon (1998), Verrecchia and Weber (2006), Cao, Ma, Tucker and Wan (2018).  
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prior literature that political connections formed through campaign-financing activity serve as 
the most observable proxy for access to politicians and political information (e.g., Christensen et 
al. 2017; Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Humphries 1991). Thus, we use political connection 
measures from Cooper et al. (2010), which are based on contributions from firms’ political 
action committees (PACs), as our first proxy for access to political information. Our second 
proxy is the existence of a government relations office at a firm. Firms’ government relations 
offices act as a central resource for analyzing the likelihood of policy change and the potential 
impact on the firm (Bremmer 2005). A key input into legislators’ policy decisions is the policy 
research provided by politically active firms regarding the economic viability of proposed 
legislation (Wright 1996). By supplying this information to legislators, politically active firms 
reinforce ongoing access to policymakers and thus political information (Hillman and Hitt 1999). 
Using these measures, we estimate that managers of politically active firms are between 5 and 7 
percentage points more likely to issue earnings guidance than their inactive peers, after 
controlling for other known firm characteristics identified in the prior literature as influencing 
disclosure policy. Moreover, we find that this difference in the propensity to guide is especially 
pronounced for firms with greater sensitivity to government actions, as measured by having the 
government as a major customer.  
If access to political information induces firms to issue guidance, then we also expect 
politically active firms to mention government policy-related terms more frequently in their 
guidance. To test this prediction, we measure the frequency of government policy-related terms 
that appear in firms’ guidance disclosures obtained from 8-K filings. Using the policy 
dictionaries developed by Baker et al. (2016) that cover topics such as government spending, 
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national defense, healthcare, trade, and fiscal and monetary policy to measure the frequency of 
policy-related terms, we find evidence consistent with this prediction.  
Since the choice to become politically active is endogenous, a concern is that our findings 
are driven by this self-selection. To address this concern, we employ various econometric 
techniques, including entropy matching, instrumental variables (where the distance of the firm’s 
headquarters from Washington D.C. is our instrument), firm fixed effects, and an analysis of 
selection on unobservables, to address the influence of both observable and unobservable 
characteristics on our inferences. Our findings are robust to these econometric techniques. 
Overall, our results are consistent with politically active firms having differential access 
to political information and voluntarily disclosing this information to their investors. However it 
is also possible that politically active firms may simply have heightened exposure to political 
outcomes, and thus are more likely to increase the provision of guidance and discuss government 
policies more to alleviate investor uncertainty, even without differential access to political 
information (Anantharaman and Zhang 2011; Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Ljungvist 2014; 
Billings, Jennings, and Lev 2015; Guay, Samuels and Taylor 2016; Hassan et al. 2019; Nagar et 
al. 2019; Verrecchia 1990).2 To assess whether this second explanation explains our results, we 
control for the firm’s sensitivity to economic policy uncertainty and find that our results hold, 
suggesting that investor demand for information about politically sensitive firms is not the sole 
reason for the increased propensity to disclose. 
To further distinguish between these two explanations, we study the timing and content 
of management guidance relative to legislation that will impact the firm. These analyses mitigate 
differences in government policy sensitivity across firms by including only those firms that 
 
2 For evidence on investor uncertainty stemming from governmental actions, see Pástor and Veronesi (2012, 2013), 
Kelly, Pástor and Veronesi (2016), and Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). 
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either directly lobbied for the legislation or are product-market peers to lobbying firms (see 
Section 5.3 for more detail). If politically active firms have differential access to political 
information and have incentives to voluntary disclose this information through guidance, we 
expect politically active firms to strategically release guidance before uncertainty about 
legislative action is resolved (i.e., when their information advantage is greatest). Consistent with 
this prediction, we find that politically active firms are more likely to issue guidance in the pre-
enactment period. In contrast, politically inactive firms experience an increase in the incidence of 
guidance during the post-enactment period. Together, this evidence suggests that both politically 
active and inactive firms are sensitive to newly enacted legislation (i.e., both groups of firms 
respond to legislative changes by issuing guidance), but politically active firms are able to issue 
guidance during a window that is consistent with differential access to political information (i.e., 
during the pre-enactment window). Moreover, if access to private information is inducing the 
decision to disclose, we expect that the content of guidance ahead of legislative decisions (i.e., 
when the firm is more likely to have political information) to be different than guidance issued 
during periods when the firm is less likely to have political information (i.e., around the earnings 
announcement). Our results are consistent with this prediction. Specifically, using firms’ own 
guidance at the prior earnings announcement as a benchmark, we find that immediately prior to 
legislative votes politically active firms change the policy-related language in their guidance 
more than politically inactive firms. Collectively, these additional tests provide further support 
for our conclusion that observed differences in management guidance by politically active firms 
are influenced by differential access to political information. 
Our work contributes to the ongoing policy debate concerning regulation over the flow of 
political information. While the STOCK Act prohibits insider trading by members of Congress, 
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this Act did not restrict Congress members from disclosing material non-public political 
information to constituents, despite concerns that this practice leads to an unfair advantage to 
those with access. Prior research provides support for this unfair advantage by documenting that 
sophisticated investors with access to political information amass greater trading profits (Gao 
and Huang 2016; Jagolinzer et al. 2018). Our findings suggest that management guidance is one 
channel through which the market can learn about the expected impact of policy developments, 
potentially mitigating concerns of an unfair advantage. 
Our findings also contribute to the literature that investigates incentives to provide 
voluntary disclosure. Extant disclosure models suggest managers will respond to greater 
uncertainty about firm value by providing more voluntary disclosure (e.g., Verrecchia 1990). 
Consistent with this theoretical prediction, a growing empirical literature finds that firms respond 
to deterioration in the information environment by providing greater voluntary disclosure (e.g., 
Balakrishnan et al. 2014; Guay et al. 2016). Recent research documents an increase in the 
provision of guidance in response to market-wide political uncertainty in general (Nagar et al. 
2019), and around monetary policy announcements, specifically (Choi et al. 2019). Furthermore, 
Hassan et al. (2019) find that firms with greater exposure to economic policy uncertainty devote 
a larger share of their quarterly conference calls to discussing political risk. Taken together, these 
papers suggest an association between aspects of political uncertainty and voluntary disclosure. 
However, they do not provide evidence on whether firms have differential access to private 
political information and if so, the mechanism through which firms can gain access to political 
information. Further, these studies do not investigate whether politically active firms choose to 
voluntarily disclose this information to their investors or provide evidence of policy-related 
discussion in firms’ guidance, which we provide.  
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In a recent study, Hung et al. (2018) examine the association between political 
connections and voluntary disclosure in an international setting. Using data from 2002 to 2004 
with political connections primarily from Southeast Asia, they document that firms with a large 
shareholder or top director that is a minister or head of state, a member of parliament, or closely 
related to a top official issue fewer voluntary disclosures. They interpret their findings as 
suggesting that these firms face lower incentives to issue voluntary disclosures because their 
political connections afford them with better access to capital and loan terms and protection from 
litigation. By contrast, we focus on the U.S. setting and examine the role of political activism to 
gain access to political information. In our setting, over the years 2001 to 2014 we show that 
firms with greater access to political information are more likely to issue guidance, discuss 
government policy more, and time guidance around political events. Taken together, our results 
along with Hung et al. suggest that the regulatory and institutional environment influences the 
extent to which politically active firms serve as a conduit through which political information 
flows to the market.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide background on the institutional 
details of political information. In Section 3, we discuss the empirical measures for our key 
constructs: a firm’s access to political information, policy-related disclosures, and a firm’s 
sensitivity to policy changes. Section 4 first describes our sample and then provides the results of 
our main tests for the association between political activity and the likelihood and content of 
guidance. Section 5 provides additional tests to disentangle alternative explanations for our 
findings. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Background on Political Information 
 When evaluating the efficacy of various policy alternatives, policymakers face 
uncertainty over how their constituents will react to or be affected by their policy decisions, as 
well as the political viability of various proposals. To reduce uncertainty, legislators will invite 
groups and individuals to provide information on the expected consequences of policy decisions. 
In communicating with their constituents, policymakers also reveal institutional details, such as 
procedural strategies that committee members will employ in markup sessions, positions that 
legislators have taken or are thinking about taking, and amendments that other legislators or 
outside groups might suggest (Wright 1996). Access to this type of information, which we (and 
prior literature) refer to as political information, can be useful in variety of settings.  
A growing body of research investigates the role of differential access to political 
information in securities markets. Gao and Huang (2016) ﬁnd that hedge funds with lobbyist ties 
earn abnormal proﬁts on policy-sensitive stocks. Christensen et al. (2017) ﬁnd that analyst 
recommendations issued by politically connected brokerage houses are more proﬁtable than 
those of non-connected brokers. The evidence in Jagolinzer et al. (2018) suggests that access to 
politicians increases managers’ and directors’ trading proﬁts. These studies provide evidence of 
unintended consequences associated with politicians’ selective disclosure of material, nonpublic 
information in the form of benefits obtained by sophisticated market participants. 
To capitalize on these benefits, an entire industry has developed recently around the 
practice of gathering and disseminating nonpublic political information to select outside parties.3 
The recent emergence of the political intelligence industry is drawing the attention of lawakers 
who publicly question the industry practice of gathering political information for well-paying 
clients, but at the same time are reluctant to take steps toward regulating the industry without a 
 
3 Jerke (2010) and Nagy and Painter (2012) provide institutional details on the political intelligence industry.    
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better understanding of how political information is disiminated and the potential consequences 
associated with differential information flow (Heltman 2015, Mullins 2012 a,b; 2014). While 
third-party consultants and sophisticated traders are the focus of media attention, some corporate 
players are bringing the practice of collecting and analyzing political inteligence in-house 
through a government relations office (Bremmer 2005).  
Consistent with the ability of politically active firms to access and rely on political 
information, additional studies explore the role of political information for firms’ corporate 
decisions. Ovtchinnikov et al. (2019) document evidence consistent with politically active firms 
innovating more (i.e., through developing and/or acquiring well cited patents). Moreover, the 
authors analyze investments in patent technology around industry de-regulation and document 
that politically active firms have an advantage over inactive firms stemming from their ability to 
anticipate regulatory developments. Wellman (2017) analyzes differences in the timing of capital 
investments between politically active and inactive firms around the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Reconciliation and Relief Act (JGTRRA). She demonstrates that politically active firms seem to 
anticipate the passage of JGTRRA, delaying investments relatively more in the pre-enactment 
period in order to of take advantage of lucrative tax incentives in the post-enactment period. 
Collectively, these studies support the notion that managers of politically active firms access and 
rely on political information when making investment decisions.  
To the extent managers have incentives to communicate political information (e.g., the 
expected impact of policy developments) to their investors, we expect that managers at 
politically active firms are more likely to issue management guidance relative to managers at 
inactive firms. Building on theory and evidence that suggests managers are motivated to reduce 
investor uncertainty by providing more voluntary disclosure, Nagar et al. 2019 document an 
10 
 
increase in the average level of management guidance in response to market-wide policy 
uncertainty, which partially mitigates the negative effect of policy uncertainty on investor 
information asymmetry. Moreover, Choi et al. (2019) document management guidance in 
advance of monetary policy news assists in reducing investor uncertainty.  
While prior research investigates time-series variation in the provision of guidance 
conditional on general policy uncertainty and investors’ reliance on guidance during high policy 
uncertainty periods, we are, by contrast, interested in the potential information flows to managers 
and capital market participants that stem from firms’ differential access to policy news. As such, 
we examine the incidence, content, and timing of voluntary guidance firms provide to the 
market. By doing so, we examine whether there is evidence consistent with managers not only 
gaining access to political information, but also sharing that information with the capital markets. 
In the next section, we discuss our empirical strategy for investigating our research questions.  
 
3. Data and Measurement  
In this section, we outline our approach for measuring firms’ access to political 
information. Since the decision to issue management guidance and the decision to invest in 
political access are not exogenously determined, we ensure that our results hold after employing 
several tests to address correlated omitted variables and endogeneity (see Section 5). 
3.1 Access to Political Information 
Our measures for political activity are intended to capture firms’ access to legislators 
because access should facilitate information flow between firms and legislators. Consistent with 
this conjecture, most scholars agree that political connections formed through campaign-
financing activity serve as the most observable proxy for access (e.g., Schuller et al. 2002; 
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Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Wright 1996; Humphries 1991). Firms’ campaign-financing activity 
(or lack thereof) is observable because of the Federal Election Committee (FEC) requirements to 
disclose campaign contributions. Although the Federal Election Campaign Act prohibits 
corporations from making contributions directly to federal elections campaigns, corporations 
may legally participate in federal election activities through a corporate sponsored Political 
Action Committee (PAC). For example, the corporate sponsored PAC can solicit contributions 
from the corporation’s executives, employees, and stockholders. Corporate executives managing 
the PAC then strategically allocate these funds to political campaigns.4 These contributions (i.e., 
hard money contributions) are summarized and reported to the FEC on an interim basis. 
Unfortunately, other forms of campaign support (such as helping candidates with fundraising, 
PAC operating expenses, and independent expenditures) do not require disclosure. To the extent 
that corporations rely on multiple political tactics in order to accomplish their objectives, 
measures based on disclosed contributions may be incomplete. However, as Cooper et al. (2010) 
discuss, regardless of how political connections are formed, as long as campaign contributions 
disclosed to the FEC are correlated with other ways that political connections are created and 
maintained, the measures we use should serve as reasonable proxies for access to political 
information.5  
Thus, our first two proxies for firms’ access to political information is based on firms’ 
campaign financing activities as reported to the FEC. The first, CONNECTED, is an indicator 
 
4 There are limits imposed on both the amount of money a PAC can solicit and the amount of money that a PAC can 
contribute to a federal election. For example, individuals can contribute up to $5,000 per year per corporate 
sponsored PAC. Contributions from the corporate sponsored PAC to candidate campaigns are limited to $5,000 per 
candidate per election. The limits on contributions to House and Senate candidates apply separately to each election 
in which a candidate participates.  In House and Senate races, each primary election, general election, runoff, and 
special election is considered a separate election. There are no limits, however, on PAC “operating costs,” which 
includes fundraising activities and electioneering campaigns. 
5 Prior literature maintains that less observable political strategies are a complementary to investments in campaign 
financing (Schuler et al. 2002). However, to the extent that other indirect sources serve as a substitute mechanism 
for obtaining political information, it would bias us against finding our predicted results.  
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variable that equals one if the firm makes any PAC contributions during the year, zero otherwise 
(Christensen et al. 2017). This simple dichotomous variable, while useful for assessing economic 
magnitudes, does not consider the degree of political contributions, nor the multi-period nature 
of political support. Our second measure, CONNECTEDCandidate, factors in both the number of 
politicians the firm supports, and also uses a longer window to measure political connections. As 
a consequence, this measure may better capture the number of channels through which 
information can flow. Specifically, following Cooper et al. (2010), it is defined as: 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑖 = 𝐿𝑛(1 + ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑡,𝑡−5
𝐽
𝑝=1 )  (1) 
where Candpt,t-5 is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has contributed money to candidate 
p over the years t-5 to t.  
In addition to gaining access through campaign support, firms can also obtain access to 
legislators by providing them with policy research. An important input into government policy 
decisions is the research that legislators receive on the economic viability of proposed legislation 
from firms’ in-house policy analysts (Wright 1996). Typically, in-house policy analysts are part 
of the firms’ government relations teams (Bremmer 2005). Thus, our next proxy for access to 
political information is the existence of a government relations division at the firm. Data on 
government relations staff come from Columbia Books & Information Services’ (CBIS) 
comprehensive historical dataset of firms’ government relations offices.6 Our proxy for access to 
political information through a government relations office, GOVAFFAIRS, equals one if firm i 
employed any government relations staff in year t, zero otherwise. 
  
 
6 CBIS was able to provide an electronic dataset beginning in 2011. For the earlier years in our sample, we hand 
collect data on firms’ government relations data from Washington Representatives, a directory published semi-
annually by Columbia Books & Information Services. We augment the electronic dataset provided by CBIS with our 
hand collected data.  
13 
 
3.2 Propensity to Guide: Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
To form our sample, we first merge the Compustat data with return data from CRSP, 
management guidance and analyst following data from I/B/E/S, political contribution data from 
the FEC files, and government relations staff data from CBIS to build a comprehensive database 
of firm contributions, government relations staff, annual firm accounting characteristics and 
performance, and guidance.7 We obtain data on the location of the firm’s headquarters from two 
sources. We scrape the headers of firm’s 10-K filings on EDGAR and fill any missing data with 
the locations reported on Compustat. Our initial sample contains 406,531 firm-quarter 
observations (representing 15,906 unique firms) for years 2001 through 2014. Our estimation 
sample requires non-missing data for all of the control variables, reducing our sample to 249,030 
observations (9,846 unique firms). We also drop 416 observations that are singletons due to the 
use of firm fixed effects in our later analyses. Our final sample contains 248,614 firm-quarter 
observations from 9,430 unique firms. 
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. As shown in Panel A, just over 
30% of our firm-quarter observations contain quarterly guidance and around 16% of our 
observations correspond to quarters when the firm is politically active. For these politically 
active firms, Panel B of Table 1 shows the incidence of guidance increases to 51.4%, while the 
incidence of guidance for inactive firms is 26.4%. This difference in the propensity to issue 
guidance between active and inactive firms is significant at the 1% level (t = 102.06). Further, 
we find that active firms use a greater number of policy-related words in their guidance (t = 
 
7 We obtain data on political contributions made by firm-sponsored political action committees from the FEC 
detailed committee and candidate summary contribution files. The FEC does not use company identifiers (i.e., 
CUSIP, PERMNO, etc.). Therefore, we match on historical company name using a computer-based algorithm. All 
matches generated from this fuzzy matching procedure are then manually screened to eliminate false positive 
matches. If we do not observe contributions for firm i in any of the detailed committee and candidate summary 
contribution files, we code the number of candidates they support and their level of PAC contributions as zero. 
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116.51, p < 0.01). These findings provide preliminary evidence that politically active firms have 
privileged access to policy-related information and disclose the effects of this information for the 
firm through increased voluntary disclosure. Panel B of Table 1 also compares additional firm 
characteristics for active and inactive observations. We observe that active firms are larger, tend 
to outperform their inactive counterparts (i.e., active firms report fewer loss quarters and amass 
greater annual returns), have lower return volatility, have higher leverage, attract more 
institutional investors, and are followed by an average of seven additional analysts. Further, 
connected firms are more likely to have the government as a major customer and their 
headquarters are located closer to Washington D.C. In the next subsection, we control for these 
observable differences across active and inactive firms. Further, in Section 5, we perform several 
additional tests to rule out the possibility that our findings for CONNECTED are due to 
correlated omitted variables.  
 
4. Empirical Tests: Propensity to Guide 
4.1 Propensity to Guide Conditional on Political Access 
To test whether politically active firms are more likely to issue management guidance, we 
estimate the following linear probability model using OLS: 
𝐺𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where the propensity to issue guidance, GUIDE, is an indicator variable set to one in firm-
quarters where firm i reports management guidance pertaining to net income (NET), earnings per 
share (EPS), fully reported earnings per share (EPS), EBITDA per share (EBT), and/or funds 
from operations (FFO); zero otherwise. We predict that the estimated coefficient on 
CONNECTED will be positively associated with GUIDE (i.e., β1 > 0).  
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We include additional controls (CONTROLSit) that may influence firms’ disclosure 
incentives. We draw these variables from prior research (e.g., Li and Zhang 2015; Huang, 
Jennings, and Yu 2017). First, we include stock returns (RETURN), return on assets (ROA), an 
indicator for loss firms (LOSS), and stock return volatility (RETVOL) to control for stock and 
financial performance. Second, we include the logarithm of market capitalization (SIZE), book-
to-market ratio (BTM), leverage ratio (LEV), institutional ownership (INSTOWN), analyst 
following (FOLLOWING), and litigation risk (LITIGATION RISK) to control for the demand for 
information. (See Appendix A for additional detail on variable definitions.) We include year-
quarter fixed effects to control for aggregate time-series trends. To mitigate concerns that time-
invariant industry characteristics affect our inferences, we estimate a version of equation (2) that 
further includes industry indicators based on the Fama-French 49 classification.  Finally, 
standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.  
 Table 2 provides the estimation results for equation (2). Regardless of whether industry 
fixed effects are included, we find that politically active firms are significantly more likely to 
issue management guidance relative to inactive firms, after controlling for typical firm 
characteristics that are associated with the decision to issue management guidance. Based on the 
results in column (1), the estimated coefficient on CONNECTED suggests that on average, 
politically active firms are five percentage points more likely to issue guidance relative to 
inactive firms (p < 0.01). This effect represents a 17% increase in the likelihood of issuing 
guidance for politically active firms.8 In columns (3) and (4), we find similar evidence when we 
re-estimate equation (2) using the continuous measure CONNECTEDCandidate (p < 0.01), 
suggesting that the propensity to guide is also increasing with the number of candidates 
 
8 If we set all control variables at their means, the probability for issuing guidance for connected (unconnected) 
firms is 32.3% (27.7%). Thus, connected firms have a 4.6% percent higher likelihood of issuing guidance (i.e., 
32.3%-27.7%), which translates into a 17% increase in the likelihood of issuing guidance (i.e., 4.6% / 27.7%).  
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supported. Finally, in columns (5) and (6), we re-estimate equation (2) using our indicator for 
whether or not the firm maintains a government relations office. In column (5), we find that 
firms with government relations offices are 7% more likely to issue guidance relative to firms 
without a government relations office (p < 0.01). The magnitude of is effect diminishes slightly 
to 5% when we include industry fixed effects in column (6) (p < 0.01). Overall, these results are 
consistent with our prediction that politically active firms are significantly more likely to issue 
management guidance relative to politically inactive firms. 
4.2 Cross-Sectional Variation in the Propensity to Guide Conditional on Political Access 
In this subsection, we examine whether politically active firms are even more likely to 
issue guidance when the firm’s earnings have heightened exposure to policy decisions. We 
classify firms that report the federal government as a major customer during the fiscal year as 
firms that have a heightened exposure to policy decisions. We identify whether the federal 
government represents a major government customer from the Compustat Segments Customer 
data (Compustat item CTYPE).  Specifically, we create an indicator variable, GOVCUST, that is 
equal to one if firm i either reports the federal government as a major customer (i.e., CTYPE = 
“GOVDOM”) during the fiscal year or reports “COMPANY” in the CTYPE field and a branch 
of the federal government under the customer name field (Compustat item CNMS). Using this 
method, we identify 26,589 firm-quarters in our sample where the federal government is 
disclosed as a major customer. We re-estimate equation (2) including a main effect and an 
interaction effect for GOVCUST. We expect the coefficient on the interaction term of 
CONNECTED×GOVCUST to be positive.  
Table 3 provides the results of this analysis. In columns (1) and (2), we find that the 
estimated coefficients on CONNECTED are positive and significant (p < 0.10), regardless of 
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whether we exclude or include industry fixed effects. Further, the estimated coefficient on 
CONNECTED×GOVCUST is positive and significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that politically 
active firms with heightened earnings exposure to government policies through government 
contracts are even more likely to issue guidance. In columns (3) through (6) we consider the 
number of connections that firms maintain (i.e., CONNECTEDCandidates) or whether or not firms 
maintain a government relations office (i.e., GOVAFFAIRS). We continue to find that politically 
active firms reporting the federal government as a major customer are even more likely to issue 
guidance relative to inactive firms (p < 0.01). These findings suggest that politically active firms 
are even more likely to issue guidance when the federal government is a major customer. Taken 
together, the results in Tables 2 and 3 are consistent with the conclusion that the higher 
likelihood of issuing guidance is in part due to greater access to political information.   
4.3 Propensity to Guide: Policy Words 
If access to political information motivates firms to increase their voluntary disclosures, 
then we should observe that politically active firms mention more policy-related terms in their 
guidance. To investigate whether political access is related to the use of policy-related discussion 
in guidance disclosures, we use 8-Ks filed around guidance events to create two quarterly 
measures of policy word use. Both measures begin with all available 8-Ks on the SEC EDGAR 
website that were filed within five days (i.e., t-2, t+2) around the earnings guidance date (t) 
reported in I/B/E/S. We then count policy words mentioned in each guidance-related 8-K 
disclosure and sum them at the firm-quarter level across all guidance-related 8-Ks.9 Our 
continuous measure of policy word use, POLICY WORDS, equals the number of policy words 
 
9 Rather than focus exclusively on the voluntary portion of firms’ 8-Ks (i.e., Item 2.02, 7.01, and 8.01) we gather all 
8-Ks around the guidance event and sum all policy-related words included in the entire 8-K. Treating all policy 
words used within 48 hours of a guidance event as voluntary is ideal in our setting because policy word used within 
any item is arguably voluntary, as guidance may trigger or be triggered by events that lead to filing other 8-K items. 
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used per 100 words in firm i’s guidance-related 8-K disclosure.10 Our dichotomous measure, 
HIGH POLICY WORDS, indicates firm-quarters where the firm’s policy word use (i.e., unscaled 
POLICY WORDS) exceeds the 75th percentile of sample observations.11 We then test our 
prediction by estimating the following model: 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
where the frequency of policy words is measured using POLICY WORDS, or HIGH POLICY 
WORDS. We predict that the estimated coefficient on CONNECTED will be positively 
associated with POLICY WORDS and HIGH POLICY WORDS (i.e., β1 > 0). Additional controls 
(CONTROLSit) are defined above. As before, we include industry, as well year-quarter fixed 
effects. We again cluster standard errors at the ﬁrm level.  
Table 4 reports results from estimating equation (3) using OLS. In columns (1) through 
(3), we report the results using the HIGH POLICY WORDS indicator. We find that conditional 
on issuing guidance, politically active firms are also more likely to report policy terms with 
relatively high frequency in their guidance-related 8-K disclosures as compared to politically 
inactive firms. This holds regardless of which measure we use to capture firms’ access to 
political information. Moreover, as shown in columns (4) through (6), our results are insensitive 
to estimating equation (3) using POLICY WORDS as the dependent variable.  
Overall, the evidence presented in this section indicates that politically active firms are 
more likely to issue guidance, on average, than politically inactive firms, and this effect is more 
pronounced when firms have heightened earnings-exposure to federal policies (i.e., they report 
 
10 Baker et al. (2016) use several dictionaries related to various categories of economic policy uncertainty to develop 
an index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU). Their primary index is constructed daily based on the number of 
news articles that contain the terms “economic” or “economy”, “uncertain” or “uncertainty”, and one or more of 
“Congress,” “deﬁcit,” “Federal Reserve,” “legislation,” “regulation,” or “White House.” In our study, we include 
these terms as well as dictionary terms used in their categorical indices. See Appendix B for a list of terms that we 
use to identify POLICY WORDS.  
11 This measure is calculated using unscaled policy words to minimize the confounding impact that scaling by total 
words can induce when the total length of the filing changes due to reasons unrelated to policy words.   
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the federal government as a major customer). Moreover, politically active firms are also more 
likely to include policy terms in their guidance-related 8-K disclosures at a significantly higher 
rate as compared to politically inactive firms. Taken together, these results are consistent with 
firms’ political activism providing disproportionate access to policy news. However, an 
alternative explanation for these findings is that investors in politically active firms demand more 
information because they face uncertainty over how political outcomes will impact the firm, even 
if the firm does not have inside political information. Additionally, our measures of political 
information flow could be correlated with an unobservable firm characteristic that increases 
propensity to guide. In the next section, we provide several additional tests to address these 
alternative explanations. 
 
5. Self-Selection and Timing Analyses 
In Section 4, we control for determinants of disclosure policy by including numerous firm 
characteristics in the regression model. However, it is possible that our measures for firms’ 
political activism, CONNECTED, CONNECTEDCandidate, and GOVAFFAIRS are significant in 
our analysis because they are correlated with another determinant that is excluded from or not 
fully controlled for in our regression models (such as general resources or political savviness). If 
this is true, the inference that firms gain access to political information through their political 
activism would not be valid.  
To address this possibility, we perform two additional types of analyses. First, we 
perform additional econometric analyses to address the potential self-selection problem. These 
approaches include the use of entropy balancing, instrumental variables, firm fixed effects, and 
analysis of selection on unobservables to address the influence of both observable and 
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unobservable characteristics correlated with CONNECTED and GUIDE on our inferences. 
Second, we study the timing of guidance in anticipation of industry-relevant legislation to better 
identify information flow. These analyses examine the extent to which politically active firms 
issue management guidance before legislative decisions are publicly revealed. Collectively, these 
additional tests provide further support for our conclusion that observed differences in 
management guidance by politically active firms stems in part from differential access to 
political information. The following subsections summarize the research design and results of 
these additional tests.  
5.1. Entropy Balancing 
As we observed in Table 1, Panel B, politically active firms differ from inactive firms 
along several dimensions. One concern with the validity of our findings is that observable 
differences across politically active and inactive firms explain differences in the propensity to 
issue guidance. To this end, in the prior sections we controlled for relevant observable 
characteristics in the regression model and included industry fixed effects throughout our 
analysis, accounting for the linear effect of the observable differences. In this section, following 
Hainmueller (2012), we employ entropy balancing to account for a possible non-linear effect 
stemming from these factors. Specifically, we balance the data across politically active and 
inactive firms relying on observable firm characteristics and repeat our analysis using this newly 
balanced data structure. Using methodology developed in Hainmueller (2012), we balance the 
data with respect to the first moment of observable firm characteristics for CONNECTED and 
GOVAFFAIRS.12 This procedure ensures that the observable features of firms with and without 
policy access have similar means. We are able to achieve covariate balance using entropy 
balancing (untabulated). We then re-estimate equation (2) using the entropy-balanced data 
 
12 We do not perform entropy balancing for CONNECTEDCandidate as it is a continuous variable. 
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structure; the results are provided in Table 5. The table shows that results are robust to the use of 
entropy balancing: the coefficient on our measure of politically active remains significantly 
positive for both proxies examined (p < 0.01). 
5.2. Instrumental Variable Analysis 
Since empirical models are often incomplete/imperfect, in this subsection we examine the 
possibility that an unobservable correlated omitted variable may be driving the results. First, we 
use instrumental variables techniques to address self-selection based on unobservable 
characteristics. We instrument for a firm’s political activism using a measure designed to capture 
how easy it would be for a firm representative to travel to Washington D.C.; proximity to 
Washington D.C. provides firms with greater access to government officials (Useem 1984). We 
believe this is a reasonable instrument because it is not clear why being closer to Washington 
D.C. would otherwise be correlated with firms’ management guidance decisions. Table 6 report 
results from estimating equation (2) using a 2SLS instrumental variable approach where we 
instrument for firms’ political connections using the distance (in thousands of miles) to 
Washington D.C. from the firm's headquarters (DISTANCE2DC), while controlling for firm 
characteristics and industry and year fixed effects. Columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 6 report the 
results from the first-stage estimation. In all cases, we find that DISTANCE2DC is negatively and 
significantly related to firms’ political activism (p < 0.01). This finding is consistent with the 
notion that a shorter distance to Washington D.C. is a strong predictor of political connections. In 
the second stage estimation, reported in columns (2), (4), and (6), we find that our proxies for 
political activism remain positive and significant.  
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5.3 Firm Fixed Effects and Firms’ Sensitivity to Policy Uncertainty 
 To provide further evidence that our findings can be attributed to firms’ differential 
access to political information, and not simply to an increase in voluntary disclosure in response 
to policy uncertainty, we perform two additional analyses in this subsection. First, to ensure that 
time-invariant firm uncertainty (or any other time-invariant firm characteristic) does not drive the 
increased likelihood to guide that we document, we include firm fixed effects in our regression 
models in addition to firm characteristics. The summary of these estimations is provided in Panel 
A of Table 7. The estimated coefficients on two of the three measures of political activism 
remain positive and significant.13 Taken together, the robustness of our results to the use of 
instrumental variable analysis and the inclusion of firm fixed effects suggest that an 
unobservable correlated omitted variable does not drive our findings. 
 The possibility still remains, however, that a time varying correlated omitted variable 
could also impact our results. For example, it is possible that a firm’s political activism is simply 
correlated with their time-varying sensitivity to government policy exposure, and our political 
activism measures are simply capturing that sensitivity. To mitigate these concerns, we include 
an additional variable (EPU BETA) to control for any additional time-varying firm exposure to 
policy uncertainty. As reported in Table 7 Panel B, we continue to find similar results. Our 
inferences also hold if we include firm fixed effects in addition to EPU BETA (not tabulated). 
Taken together, these additional analyses suggest that our findings can be attributed to 
differential access to political information rather than other firm characteristics. 
 
13 As an alternative approach to gauge the potential impact of unobservables on our results, we estimate a series of 
models with and without controls and use the stability of the coefficient on our proxies for political access and R2 to 
quantify the minimum level of selection on unobservables required to create our results. To do this, we follow the 
approach introduced in Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) as operationalized by Oster (2017). Based on the model 
reported in column (1) of Table 7 panel A, the methods outlined in Oster (2017) suggest that selection on 
unobservables would need to account for 212% of the variation accounted for by the included controls (results not 
tabulated). 
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5.3. Timing of Guidance around Political Events 
 One concern with our prior results is that they do not provide direct evidence on the 
differential flow of political information. To provide additional support for our inferences, we 
study differences in the timing of guidance around legislative events. We conjecture that, if 
politically active ﬁrms have access to political information, then active ﬁrms should 
communicate earlier than their inactive peers around political events that are equally important to 
active and inactive firms.  
To identify legislation that impacts firms in our sample, we rely on a sample of legislative 
bills where either (1) the focal firm (or a peer) lobbied for the bill (signaling the bill is 
economically important to the focal firm and/or peer firm), and (2) the bill was ultimately signed 
into law.14,15 Lobbying disclosures include details on the total amount of lobbying dollars spent 
by firms across all issues (e.g., taxation, budget and appropriation, healthcare, etc.).16 In addition 
to providing details on the issues of interest to the firm, the lobbying disclosures also include 
details on specific bills.17 We obtain the date each bill is introduced and the date of each bill’s 
final vote before it is signed into law from ProPublica’s Congress API.18 While each bill is voted 
on many times throughout its life, we focus on the final roll call vote as this is the date on which 
 
14 This approach has similar intuition to that of Cohen et al. (2013). They develop a methodology designed to 
measure the impact of legislation on affected firms (and industries) by mapping terms used for industry 
classifications to the language in legislative proposals under the assumption that most legislative changes tend to 
apply to entire industries, rather than to specific firms.  
15 Lobbying reports are filed with the Secretary of the Senate’s Office of Public Records and are available by 
calendar year beginning in 1998. The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) maintains the lobbying data, which we 
manually match to Compustat by company name. The lobbying reports disclose specific bills that firms lobby for.  
16 The full list of lobbying issue codes can be found on the House.gov website: 
https://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/help/default.htm?turl=WordDocuments%2Flobbyingissuecodes.htm. There are 
a total of 79 issue codes. 
17 For example, from reviewing Lockheed Martin’s 2014 lobbying disclosures, we learn that the firm spent over $14 
million on lobbying and lobbied over policies pertaining to defense, the federal budget and appropriations, aviation, 
and taxes. Some of the specific bills that Lockheed Martin targeted include: the Howard P. “Buck” McKeon 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (H.R.4435), Carl Levin National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (S.2410), and the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R.4870). This detail 
was pulled from OpenSecrets.org: https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000104&year=2014.  
18 https://projects.propublica.org/api-docs/congress-api/   
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virtually all uncertainty around the bill’s fate is removed. These procedures yield 415 bills that 
firms lobbied on and were ultimately passed into law. Using these events, we can identify the 
period before and including the passage of legislation likely to impact the firm, providing a 
setting to test our information flow hypothesis. This design helps mitigate differences in 
government policy sensitivity across firms by including in our analysis only those firms that 
either directly lobbied for the legislation or are product-market peers of the lobbying firm(s). 
We conjecture that, if firms obtain information about legislative outcomes through their 
political access, then firms with access should communicate more than their inactive peers in the 
days before enactment (i.e., prior to public knowledge of the final details and outcome of the 
final vote). To focus on voluntary guidance that is likely driven by the access to legislative 
outcomes, we eliminate guidance observations issued around the firm’s earnings announcement. 
We examine all non-earnings announcement guidance issued by focal firms or their peers in the 
30 days before and 30 days after the final roll call vote for bills that the focal firm lobbies for. 
We then calculate the number of days between the guidance and the final roll call vote. We 
identify peers using Hoberg and Phillips’ (2010) product-description-based classifications rather 
than industrial classifications. We do this because appropriations bills dominate other forms of 
legislation in our sample; therefore, as appropriations concern eligible bidders for procurement 
contracts most directly, we feel that product description-based classifications are the most 
relevant peer group definition.19  
To test our conjecture that firms with access to private political information are more 
likely to issue guidance before the final roll call vote, we analyze whether the distribution of the 
timing of guidance by firms with political access differs from the distribution of the timing of 
 
19 We read the titles and topics of a sample of 250 of the 415 bills in this analysis. Of the 250, 121 bills are 
appropriations bills, 26 concern regulation, and 19 concern taxation. The remainder are a mix related to immigration 
(H1b visas), subsidies, and trade bills. 
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guidance by firms without political access around the final vote. To provide statistical tests of 
our conjecture, we use Epanechnikov kernel density estimates.20 Kernel density estimation uses 
observed data to estimate the distribution function that generated the data. Though inspection of 
density plots can be quite convincing, we provide several distributional tests to confirm our 
inferences from the density plots. First, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test, which tests 
of the hypothesis that two samples come from the same distribution.21 In addition to testing for 
equality of distributions, the K-S test allows us to test directional hypotheses around the date of 
the final roll call. We supplement the K-S test with the Epps-Singleton (E-S) test, which is more 
robust for testing the equality of distributions of discrete data. We conduct these tests using both 
CONNECTED and GOVAFFAIRS to measure political access. 
Figure 1 plots the Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of non-earnings announcement 
guidance issued in the 60 days around the final roll call vote (i.e., 30 days before and 30 days 
after) for connected and unconnected firms with 95% confidence intervals. Consistent with our 
conjecture, we observe that guidance issued by CONNECTED firms is concentrated in the pre-
vote period, and this difference is significant at the 5% level for the two weeks leading up to the 
final vote.  
The first row of Panel A of Table 8 reports a K-S test of the hypothesis that inactive firms 
(CONNECTED = 0) are more likely to guide in the 30 days before and after the final roll call 
vote than their politically active peers (CONNECTED = 1). Consistent with our expectations, we 
reject this hypothesis before the vote and fail to reject it following the vote. The second row of 
Table 8 reports a K-S test of the hypothesis that unconnected firms (CONNECTED = 0) are less 
 
20 A natural question is why, when faced with discrete data (naturally binned by days), we chose to use kernel 
density estimation. Weekends, during which there is little voting and guidance activity, create a large amount of 
noise in the plot making the differences in the distributions impossible to visualize without non-day binning.  
21 Although the K-S test was developed for continuous data, Conover (1972) shows that this test is conservative for 
discrete data. 
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likely to guide in the 30 days before and after the final roll call vote than their connected peers 
(CONNECTED = 1). Consistent with our expectations, we fail to reject this hypothesis before the 
vote and reject it following the vote. The third row of Panel A and Panel B report K-S and E-S 
tests, respectively, of the hypothesis that the distributions of guidance by connected and non-
connected firms are equal in the pre and post vote period. We are able to reject this hypothesis 
under both tests in the pre period (p < 0.01) and post period (p < 0.09). In untabulated analyses, 
we find these results hold when comparing the distribution of guidance across firms with and 
without government relations offices. 
A disadvantage of this distributional analysis is that it is not able to control for observable 
and unobservable differences between the two groups. We perform two tests to determine if our 
results are induced by differences that are not controlled for. First, as a falsification test, we 
examine guidance that is bundled with earnings announcements. Our tests above rely on the 
notion that firms choose to issue guidance when they gain access to political information, and 
thus assumes that the firm can choose the date on which it issues guidance. If firm characteristics 
or other unobservable factors induce the findings in Panel A of Table 8 for the timing of non-
bundled guidance, we should continue to find significant differences in the relative timing of 
bundled guidance. In untabulated analysis, we find that firms with and without political access 
are equally likely to issue bundled guidance in the days around the final vote, and that neither 
group exhibits the clear pre-vote spike and post-vote slump in bundled guidance exhibited in 
Figure 1.  
As an alternative way to address the potential effect of observable factors, we model the 
timing of guidance around the final roll call vote as a function of the firm-level observables used 
in Table 2. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
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𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
where negative (positive) values of TIMING measure the number of days that guidance is issued 
before (after) the legislation. Thus, TIMING ranges from -30 to +30. In addition to the set of 
controls included previously, we include fiscal quarter and firm fixed effects. Moreover, to 
ensure that we are not attributing our findings to a mechanical correlation between the timing of 
bills and firms’ fiscal calendars, we include calendar month indicators. Consistent with our 
expectation that politically active firms will issue guidance sooner relative to unconnected firms, 
column (1) of Table 8, Panel C shows that the estimated coefficient on CONNECTED is 
significantly negative. The negative coefficient is consistent with the distributional analysis 
presented in Panel A.  
Next, we analyze the distribution of guidance leading up to and following the final roll 
call vote conditional on the length of time between introduction of the bill and enactment. We 
expect differential access to political information is increasing with the length of time between 
introduction and the final roll call vote. Thus, we expect more dramatic differences between 
active and inactive firms in pre-enactment window with the bill moves less rapidly through the 
legislative process (i.e., political information is more valuable when bills are more controversial). 
We classify a vote as slow when the time between introduction and enactment exceeds the first 
quartile of bill speeds of eight weeks (56 days). The first quartile of bill speeds corresponds to 
the notional expected speed of a bill that experiences no delays.22  
 
22 In each chamber (House and Senate) a bill must (1) be introduced, numbered, and assigned to a committee; (2) 
read, debated, and voted on in committee; and (3) returned to the chamber for debate and vote. Once both houses 
have voted, any differences in the two bills are voted upon as amendments in reconciliation. Based on the 
congressional calendar and observations of the function of both houses, we expect that the minimum time required 
for each step to be no less than one week (see https://thinkprogress.org/the-three-day-workweek-d4944a813746/,  
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/08/09/the-empty-chamber, and https://www.congress.gov/days-in-
session). 
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Figure 2 plots the densities of guidance for firms with and without political access around 
the final vote for bills that move through both houses of Congress in less than eight weeks. These 
densities rarely diverge and critically overlap for the two weeks leading up to the vote. This is 
consistent with the notion that the firms do not have material, nonpublic information to disclose 
to their investors. In contrast, Figure 3 plots densities for the same groups over the same period, 
but for bills that take more than eight weeks to pass. In this subsample, we find that the effect 
evident in Figure 1 is even more pronounced. The difference in findings between Figures 2 and 3 
could be a result of two potential mechanisms: first, fast bills may move too quickly for firms to 
gather and release information; second, fast bills may be unimportant, uncontroversial, or not 
associated with high levels of uncertainty. Thus, while information may be available to the firm, 
the firm may see no value in releasing the information. To determine if this result holds in the 
multivariate setting, we also conduct a cross-sectional test where we define the variable FAST to 
be equal to one when the bill is passed in fewer than eight weeks and zero otherwise. In column 
(2) of Table 8, Panel B, we present the results from estimating equation (3) including FAST and 
its interaction with CONNECTED. Consistent with Figures 2 and 3, we find that the results in 
column (1) are concentrated in the bills that pass in more than eight weeks.  
Finally, we examine whether changes in the language accompanying guidance issued 
around these legislative events is consistent with differences in access to private political 
information. We argue that Figures 1 and 3, and Table Panels A, B, and C are suggestive of firms 
using their access to amass private political information and then releasing this information to 
investors in the two weeks prior to the legislative action.  If this spike in disclosure is driven, as 
we argue, by the arrival of new information, then we expect a greater change in the government 
29 
 
policy related discussion contained in this guidance for firms with political access compared to 
their peers firms without access.  
To test our prediction, we compare the government policy words used in the text of 
guidance issued in the two weeks prior to the date of the final vote (i.e., treatment) to guidance 
issued in the 90 days prior to the date the bill is introduced that is also bundled with earnings 
announcements (i.e., benchmark). By using bundled earnings guidance as our benchmark, we 
assume that the earnings announcement, not access to private political information, drives the 
decision to issue the benchmark guidance. In essence, we assume that the language used in the 
benchmark guidance reflects general firm characteristics (such as general exposure to policy 
uncertainty), and thus any difference in language used in the treatment guidance reflects private 
political information. 
To evaluate how similar the use of policy words is between legislative guidance and 
earnings announcement guidance, we calculate the cosine difference between the two texts. We 
use the token frequency- inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) weighted cosine difference as 
this measure puts less weight on common words. The cosine difference increases as the two texts 
become more dissimilar. In Panel D of Table 8, we regress the TF-IDF weighted cosine distance 
on CONNECTED and our control variables. As we did in the timing analysis above, we again 
limit our sample to firms that compete with firms that lobby for the bills around which we 
calculate our measures and include industry fixed effects. Thus the coefficient on CONNECTED 
captures the extent to which the change in the information disclosed with guidance differs 
between firms with political access and their product market competitors.  
We find that the estimated coefficient on CONNECTED is positive and significant, 
indicating that, relative to inactive firms, the guidance politically active firms issue in the two 
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weeks prior to a legislative final vote is more dissimilar to that firm’s bundled earnings guidance 
issued prior to the introduction of the bill. This analysis suggests that firms with political access 
change the information set accompanying their guidance more prior to legislative actions than 
their peers without access. While our measure of new information (TF-IDF weighted cosine 
distance) does not pinpoint precisely which policy-words are emphasized differently prior to the 
legislative final vote, the measure does demonstrate a change in the use of policy-related words 
for politically active firms. This evidence is consistent with politically active firms having access 
to different information than politically inactive firms and voluntarily disclosing that information 
to investors. 
To further address concerns that this change in information set is due to a change in the 
demand for information rather than the supply of information, we conduct two additional 
untabulated analyses. First, we repeat the analysis including EPU BETA as a control for the 
firm’s sensitivity to government policy uncertainty over time and thus variation in the demand 
for information. The findings in Table 8 Panel D continue to hold with this additional control. 
Second, we restrict the sample to only government contractors, who are most directly impacted 
by the legislation, in order to focus on firms whose exposure to legislative action is more 
comparable. We again find results similar to those reported in Table 8 Panel D for this 
subsample. Taken together, these additional analyses support our central conjecture that firms 
that generate private information through political access release it to their shareholders.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 In this study, we examine whether and how political information is disclosed to market 
participants. We document that firms who are politically active are more likely to issue guidance, 
especially when the federal government is a major customer. Moreover, politically active firms 
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include more policy-related terms in their guidance disclosures than politically inactive firms. 
These findings are robust to various econometric techniques to control for the endogenous 
decision to become politically active. As additional evidence that access to political information 
induces firms to issue guidance, we examine the timing and content of guidance relative to the 
passage of bills that potentially impact the firm. We find that politically active (inactive) firms 
are significantly more likely to issue non bundled guidance in the period immediately before 
(after) legislation is passed. Moreover, the similarity in policy-related language between 
guidance issued immediately before legislation is passed and bundled earnings guidance issued 
prior to the introduction of the bill is lower for politically active firms than politically inactive 
firms. Overall, our results are consistent with politically active firms obtaining privileged access 
to policy-related information and incorporating it into the guidance they provide investors, 
thereby facilitating the flow of political information to the market. 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name Description 
GUIDE An indicator variable set to one in firm-quarters where firm i reports 
management guidance pertaining to net income, earnings per share, 
fully reported earnings per share, EBITDA, EBITDA per share, 
and/or funds from operations, zero otherwise. 
  
POLICY WORDS The number of policy words per 100 words within 8-Ks that 
correspond to guidance. Policy words are defined based on Baker et 
al. (2016). Appendix B contains a complete list of the policy words. 
  
HIGH POLICY WORDS An indicator variable set equal to one for firm-quarters in which the 
aggregate number of policy words in the firm’s 8-Ks are above the 
75th percentile in sample period, zero otherwise. 
  
TIMING The number of days that guidance is issued before (after) legislation. 
This variable ranges from -30 to +30. 
  
CONNECTED Indicates whether the firm reports any hard-money Political Action 
Committee contributions during fiscal year t.   
  
CONNECTEDCandidate The natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of political candidates 
(House, Senate, and Presidential) that the firm contributed money to 
over years t-5 to t. 
  
GOVAFFAIRS An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm had a government 
affairs office during year t, zero otherwise.   
  
GOVCUST An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm reported the U.S. 
federal government as one of its major customers during year t, zero 
otherwise.  
  
SIZE The natural logarithm of the firm’s beginning-of-quarter market 
capitalization. 
  
BTM The firm’s beginning-of-quarter book-to-market ratio. 
  
DLOSS An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm reports a loss in the 
current quarter, zero otherwise. 
  
RETURN The firm’s cumulative daily returns over the 12 months prior to 
quarter t. 
  
ROA The firm’s net income divided by total assets at the beginning of 
quarter t.  
  
RETVOL The standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns over the 12 
months prior to quarter t. 
  
LEV The firm’s debt divided by total assets at the beginning of quarter t.  
  
INSTOWN The percentage of the firm’s shares held by institutional investors at 
the beginning of quarter t.  
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APPENDIX A, CONT. 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name Description 
FOLLOWING The natural log of the number of analysts issuing a forecast for the 
current fiscal quarter as reported in I/B/E/S. 
  
LITIGATION RISK An indicator variables set equal to one if the firm operates within a 
litigious 4-digit SIC code, zero otherwise. 
  
DISTANCE2DC The distance (measured in thousands of miles) to Washington D.C. 
from the firm's headquarters, as reported in Compustat. 
  
FAST An indicator variable set equal to one if the bill passed in fewer than 
56 days, zero otherwise. 
EPU BETA The sensitivity of the firm’s daily stock returns to the daily economic 
policy uncertainty (EPU) index over the prior fiscal quarter. 
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APPENDIX B 
Policy Term List from Baker et al. (2016) 
 
Category Term Sets 
Entitlement Programs 
entitlement program, entitlement spending, government entitlements, 
social security, Medicaid, Medicare, government welfare, welfare 
reform, unemployment insurance, unemployment benefits, food 
stamps, afdc, tanf, wic program, disability insurance, part d, oasdi, 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Earned Income Tax 
Credit, EITC, head start program, public assistance, government 
subsidized housing 
  
Financial Regulation 
banking supervision, glass-steagall, tarp, bank supervision, thrift 
supervision, dodd-frank, financial reform, commodity futures trading 
commission, cftc, house financial services committee, basel, capital 
requirement, Volcker rule, bank stress test, securities and exchange 
commission, sec, deposit insurance, fdic, fslic, ots, occ, firrea, truth in 
lending 
  
Fiscal Policy and 
Government Spending 
government spending, federal budget, budget battle, balanced budget, 
defense spending, military spending, entitlement spending, fiscal 
stimulus, budget deficit, federal debt, national debt, Gramm-Rudman, 
debt ceiling, fiscal footing, government deficits, balance the budget 
  
Health Care 
health care, Medicaid, Medicare, health insurance, malpractice tort 
reform, malpractice reform, prescription drugs, drug policy, food and 
drug administration, FDA, medical malpractice, prescription drug act, 
medical insurance reform, medical liability, part d, affordable care act, 
Obamacare 
  
Monetary Policy 
federal reserve, the fed, money supply, open market operations, 
quantitative easing, monetary policy, fed funds rate, overnight lending 
rate, Bernanke, Volcker, Greenspan, central bank, interest rates, fed 
chairman, fed chair, lender of last resort, discount window, European 
Central Bank, ECB, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, BOJ, Bank of 
China, Bundesbank, Bank of France, Bank of Italy 
  
National Security 
national security, war, military conflict, terrorism, terror, 9/11, defense 
spending, military spending, police action, armed forces, base closure, 
military procurement, saber rattling, naval blockade, military embargo, 
no-fly zone, military invasion 
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APPENDIX B, CONT. 
Policy Term List from Baker et al. (2016) 
Category Term Sets 
Regulation 
regulation, banking supervision, glass-steagall, tarp, bank supervision, 
thrift supervision, dodd-frank, financial reform, commodity futures 
trading commission, cftc, house financial services committee, basel, 
capital requirement, Volcker rule, bank stress test, securities and 
exchange commission, sec, deposit insurance, fdic, fslic, ots, occ, 
firrea, truth in lending, union rights, card check, collective bargaining 
law, national labor relations board, nlrb, minimum wage, living wage, 
right to work, closed shop, wages and hours, workers compensation, 
advance notice requirement, affirmative action, at-will employment, 
overtime requirements, trade adjustment assistance, davis-bacon, equal 
employment opportunity, eeo, osha, antitrust, competition policy, 
merger policy, monopoly, patent, copyright, federal trade commission, 
ftc, unfair business practice, cartel, competition law, price fixing, class 
action, healthcare lawsuit, tort reform, tort policy, punitive damages, 
medical malpractice, energy policy, energy tax, carbon tax, cap and 
trade, cap and tax, drilling restrictions, offshore drilling, pollution 
controls, environmental restrictions, clean air act, clean water act, 
environmental protection agency, epa, immigration policy 
  
Sovereign Debt, Currency 
Crises 
sovereign debt, currency crisis, currency crash, currency devaluation, 
currency revaluation, currency manipulation, euro crisis, Eurozone 
crisis, european financial crisis, european debt, asian financial crisis, 
asian crisis, Russian financial crisis, Russian crisis, exchange rate 
  
Taxes taxes, tax, taxation, taxed 
  
Trade Policy 
import tariffs, import duty, import barrier, government subsidies, 
government subsidy, wto, world trade organization, trade treaty, trade 
agreement, trade policy, trade act, doha round, uruguay round, gatt, 
dumping 
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FIGURE 1 
Plots of Epanechnikov Kernel Density Estimates (EKDE) Around Final Vote Datea 
 
 
a This figure provides the EKDE estimates and 95% confidence intervals around the final vote date. The sample excludes 
earnings announcement guidance. 
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FIGURE 2 
Plots of Epanechnikov Kernel Density Estimates (EKDE) for “Fast” Bills Around Final Vote Datea 
 
 
 
a This figure provides the EKDE estimates and 95% confidence intervals around the final vote date for “fast” bills. A bill is 
defined as “fast” if it moves through both houses of Congress in less than eight weeks. The sample excludes earnings 
announcement guidance. 
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FIGURE 3 
Plots of Epanechnikov Kernel Density Estimates (EKDE) for “Slow” Bills Around Final Vote Datea 
 
 
a This figure provides the EKDE estimates and 95% confidence intervals around the final vote date for “slow” bills. A bill is 
defined as “fast” if it moves through both houses of Congress in more than eight weeks. The sample excludes earnings 
announcement guidance. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample (N= 248,614) 
Variablea Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
GUIDE 0.305 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000 
POLICY WORDS 0.216 0.355 0.000 0.000 0.455 
CONNECTED 0.162 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONNECTEDCandidate 14.554 56.337 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GOVAFFAIRS  0.047 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 5.998 2.123 4.470 5.961 7.418 
log(BTM) -0.681 0.898 -1.166 -0.615 -0.135 
LOSS 0.321 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000 
RETURN 0.142 0.684 -0.226 0.054 0.344 
RETVOL 0.035 0.022 0.020 0.029 0.044 
LEV 0.204 0.205 0.017 0.152 0.327 
FOLLOWING 5.325 6.362 0.000 3.000 8.000 
LITIGATION RISK 0.222 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INSTOWN 0.367 0.343 0.000 0.303 0.698 
GOVCUST 0.107 0.309 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DISTANCE2DC 1.989 2.264 0.496 1.161 3.192 
      
Panel B: Sample Means for Connected vs. Not Connected Observations 
Variablea 
CONNECTED = 1 
(N = 40,389)  
CONNECTED = 0 
(N = 208,225)  
Differenceb 
(t-statistic) 
GUIDE 0.514 
 
0.264 
 
0.250*** 
(102.06) 
POLICY WORDS 0.362 
 
0.188 
 
0.174*** 
(91.60) 
HIGH POLICY WORDS 0.073  0.013  0.060*** 
(74.73) 
SIZE 8.244 
 
5.563 
 
2.681*** 
(262.47) 
log(BTM) -0.776 
 
-0.663 
 
-0.113*** 
(-23.23) 
LOSS 0.161 
 
0.352 
 
-0.191*** 
(-76.01) 
RETURN 0.167 
 
0.137 
 
0.030*** 
(7.96) 
RETVOL 0.024  0.037  -0.013*** 
(-107.21) 
LEV 0.268  0.192  0.076*** 
(68.58) 
FOLLOWING 11.090  4.207  6.883*** 
(217.02) 
LITIGATION RISK 0.144  0.237  -0.093*** 
(-41.11) 
INSTOWN 0.506  0.340  0.166*** 
(90.59) 
GOVCUST 0.185  0.092  0.093*** 
(55.79) 
DISTANCE2DC 1.677  2.049   -0.372*** 
(-30.28) 
      
a All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
b All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (t-statistic in parentheses).  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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TABLE 2 
Political Connections and Propensity to Guide 
Variablea,b Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONNECTED (+) 0.05*** 0.04*** 
    
 
 (3.41) (3.40) 
    
        
CONNECTEDCandidate (+) 
  
0.01*** 0.01*** 
  
 
 
  
(3.02) (2.69) 
  
        
GOVAFFAIRS  (+) 
    
0.07*** 0.05***  
 
    
(3.65) (2.71) 
        
SIZE  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***  
 (2.69) (4.71) (2.47) (4.63) (3.24) (5.58) 
        
log(BTM)  -0.02*** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.00 -0.02*** 0.00  
 (-5.07) (-0.03) (-5.14) (-0.03) (-4.81) (0.24) 
        
LOSS  -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06***  
 (-12.45) (-13.79) (-12.51) (-13.82) (-12.50) (-13.71) 
        
RETURN  -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01***  
 (-5.05) (-2.52) (-4.94) (-2.46) (-5.11) (-2.64) 
        
ROA  0.19*** 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.12***  
 (11.51) (8.41) (11.56) (8.43) (11.37) (8.27) 
        
RETVOL  -0.62*** -0.97*** -0.64*** -0.98*** -0.64*** -0.96***  
 (-5.20) (-8.13) (-5.34) (-8.21) (-5.36) (-8.04) 
        
LEV  0.08*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.11***  
 (4.49) (6.46) (4.57) (6.56) (4.80) (6.72) 
        
INSTOWN  0.15*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.11***  
 (12.49) (9.87) (12.56) (9.93) (12.49) (9.89) 
        
log(FOLLOWING)  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***  
 (28.47) (29.53) (28.71) (29.75) (28.97) (29.96) 
        
LITIGATION RISK  0.06*** -0.00 0.06*** -0.00 0.06*** -0.00  
 (7.02) (-0.06) (6.94) (-0.08) (6.74) (-0.09) 
        
Cluster by Firm   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.21 0.27 0.21 0.27 0.21 0.27 
N  248,614 248,614 248,614 248,614 248,614 248,614 
        
 
a All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
b All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
Political Connections and Propensity to Guide Conditional on Government Customers 
Variablea,b Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONNECTED (+) 0.03* 0.03** 
    
 
 (1.71) (1.98) 
    
        
CONNECTEDCandidate (+) 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
 
 
  
(1.16) (1.00) 
  
        
GOVAFFAIRS  (+) 
    
0.04** 0.02  
 
    
(2.09) (1.11) 
        
GOVCUST  0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.00 0.07*** 0.02*  
 (4.41) (0.65) (4.29) (0.40) (6.00) (1.78) 
        
CONNECTED x GOVCUST (+) 0.08*** 0.08***  
 (3.04) (3.06) 
    
        
CONNECTEDCandidate x 
GOVCUST 
(+) 0.02*** 
(3.54) 
0.02*** 
(3.98) 
        
GOVAFFAIRS x GOVCUST (+) 
    
0.12*** 0.15***  
 
    
(3.22) (4.16) 
        
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.21 0.27 0.21 0.27 0.21 0.27 
N  248,614 248,614 248,614 248,614 248,614 248,614 
        
F Statistic: CONNECTED + 
CONNECTED x GOVCUST 
 17.76*** 17.83*** 21.05*** 23.28*** 22.39*** 25.63*** 
        
 
a All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
b All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Political Connections and Policy Word Use Within Guidance 
  HIGH POLICY WORDS POLICY WORDS 
Variablea,b Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONNECTED (+) 0.03***   0.03
***    
 (4.97)   (2.60)   
        
log(CONNECTEDCandidate) (+)  0.01
***   0.01
***   
  (5.46)   (3.56)  
        
GOVAFFAIRS  (+)   0.07
***   0.06
***  
   (5.39)   (4.00) 
        
SIZE  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01**  
 (7.51) (6.50) (7.68) (-2.25) (-3.05) (-2.52) 
        
log(BTM)  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01**  
 (4.48) (3.98) (4.47) (-2.21) (-2.49) (-2.24) 
        
LOSS  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***  
 (5.38) (5.15) (5.46) (-3.39) (-3.53) (-3.35) 
        
RETURN  0.00* 0.00** 0.00* -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***  
 (1.78) (2.21) (1.70) (-4.28) (-4.10) (-4.31) 
        
ROA  -0.03** -0.03* -0.03** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10***  
 (-2.16) (-1.94) (-2.05) (3.06) (3.15) (3.09) 
        
RETVOL  0.75*** 0.71*** 0.68*** -0.93*** -0.96*** -0.98***  
 (5.56) (5.43) (5.13) (-3.47) (-3.60) (-3.67) 
        
LEV  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.09***  
 (2.81) (2.74) (3.38) (-4.53) (-4.57) (-4.29) 
        
INSTOWN  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***  
 (0.68) (0.78) (0.58) (10.85) (10.91) (10.86) 
        
log(FOLLOWING)  -0.01** -0.01 -0.01* 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***  
 (-2.15) (-1.62) (-1.78) (3.79) (4.02) (3.94) 
        
LITIGATION RISK  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  
 (-0.55) (-0.46) (-0.23) (-0.24) (-0.21) (-0.13) 
        
Cluster by Firm   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.21 
N  75,076 75,076 75,076 75,076 75,076 75,076 
        
 
a All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
b All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Political Connections and Propensity to Guide – Entropy Balanced Sample 
Variablea,b Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONNECTED (+) 0.08*** 0.06***    
 (4.99) (4.17)   
      
GOVAFFAIRS  (+)   0.14
*** 0.05***  
   (7.04) (3.08) 
      
SIZE  -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.06*** -0.03***  
 (-5.79) (-2.63) (-8.53) (-4.20) 
      
log(BTM)  -0.09*** -0.02** -0.09*** -0.02  
 (-8.36) (-2.33) (-6.29) (-1.63) 
      
LOSS  -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08***  
 (-6.30) (-7.70) (-5.83) (-6.36) 
      
RETURN  -0.03*** -0.01** -0.05*** -0.02**  
 (-5.01) (-2.33) (-4.26) (-1.96) 
      
ROA  0.04 0.07 0.14 0.11  
 (0.51) (0.98) (0.94) (0.91) 
      
RETVOL  -5.56*** -3.78*** -10.28*** -6.02***  
 (-11.24) (-9.06) (-11.97) (-8.84) 
      
LEV  0.10** 0.15*** 0.14** 0.24***  
 (2.27) (3.59) (2.42) (4.74) 
      
INSTOWN  0.15*** 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.13***  
 (7.23) (5.98) (5.17) (5.07) 
      
log(FOLLOWING)  0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11***  
 (10.20) (12.40) (7.49) (9.33) 
      
LITIGATION RISK  0.14*** -0.06 0.14*** -0.14***  
 (6.34) (-1.56) (4.76) (-2.92) 
      
Cluster by Firm   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.11 0.23 0.14 0.29 
N  248,614 248,614 248,614 248,614 
      
 
a All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
b All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by 
firm. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Political Connections and Propensity to Guide – Instrumental Variable 
  CONNECTED CONNECTEDCandidate GOVAFFAIRS 
 Prediction 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Variablea,b  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONNECTED (+)  0.37
***      
  (3.25)     
        
CONNECTEDCandidate (+)    0.08
***    
    (3.28)   
        
GOVAFFAIRS  (+)      0.73
***  
      (3.19) 
        
DISTANCE2DC (-) -0.01***  -0.06
***  -0.01
***   
 (-8.69)  (-9.90)  (-8.49)  
        
Wald  Χ2  2,018.82*** 2,826.31*** 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
248,614 
1,251.84*** 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
248,614 
    
Controls  Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
248,614 
Cluster by Firm   
Year-Qtr. Fixed Effects  
Industry Fixed Effects  
N  
        
 
a All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
b All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Political Connections and Propensity to Guide – Robustness 
Panel A: Firm Fixed Effects 
Variablea,b Prediction (1) (2) (3) 
CONNECTED (+) 0.03**    
 (2.07)   
     
CONNECTEDCandidate (+)  0.01
*   
  (1.70)  
     
GOVAFFAIRS  (+)   -0.00  
   (-0.23) 
     
     
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm   Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.60 0.60 0.60 
N  248,614 248,614 248,614 
 
Panel B: Sensitivity to Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Variablea,b Prediction (1) (2) (3) 
CONNECTED (+) 0.04***   
  (3.02)   
     
CONNECTEDCandidate (+)  0.01**  
   (2.26)  
     
GOVAFFAIRS  (+)   0.06*** 
    (3.11) 
     
EPU BETA  0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
  (2.43) (2.40) (2.41) 
     
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm   Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.27 0.27 0.27 
N  228,500 228,500 228,500 
     
  
a All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
b All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
Guidance Around Final Roll-Call Vote 
Panel A: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two-Sample Test for Distribution Around Final Roll-Call Vote 
Null Hypothesis 30 Days Pre 30 Days Post 
Not Connected > Connected ≤ 0.001 0.959 
Not Connected < Connected  ≥ 0.999 0.009 
Not Connected = Connected ≤ 0.001 0.019 
   
Panel B: Epps-Singleton Two-Sample Test for Distribution Around Final Roll-Call Vote 
Null Hypothesis 30 Days Pre 30 Days Post 
Not Connected = Connected  0.003 0.085 
   
Panel C: Regression Analyses of Days from Final Roll-Call Vote to Guidance Release 
Variablea,b Prediction (1) Prediction (2) 
CONNECTED (-) -2.16** (-) -2.58*** 
  (-2.46)  (-2.82) 
     
FAST   (-) -1.23*** 
    (-2.68) 
     
CONNECTED x FAST   (+) 1.64*** 
    (2.59) 
     
Controls  Yes  Yes 
Cluster by Firm   Yes  Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Calendar Month Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.14  0.14 
N  49,394  49,394 
F Statistic: CONNECTED + 
 CONNECTED x FAST = 0    
0.98 
Panel D: Textual Differences Between Guidance Issued Prior to Bill Introduction and Passage 
Variablea,b Prediction (1) 
CONNECTED (+) 0.06*** 
  (3.43) 
   
Controls  Yes 
Cluster by Firm   Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.14 
N  5,522 
 
a All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
b All p-values are based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses) and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed test), respectively. 
 
 
